Charting No Man\u27s Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Doctrine to Interstate Compacts by Brakman Reiser, Dana
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1998
Charting No Man's Land: Applying Jurisdictional
and Choice of Law Doctrine to Interstate
Compacts
Dana Brakman Reiser
Brooklyn Law School, dana.brakman@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
111 Harvard Law Review 1991 (1998)
NOTES
CHARTING NO MAN'S LAND:
APPLYING JURISDICTIONAL AND CHOICE OF LAW
DOCTRINES TO INTERSTATE COMPACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution empowers states to create interstate compacts, to
address the many problems occurring among or in multiple states,
such as establishing boundaries or running a transportation system.
Many complicated structural constitutional doctrines2 are particularly
difficult to apply to interstate compact agencies. Because the applica-
tion of these doctrines is often guided by categorization of an entity as
state or federal, compact entities, functioning in the "no man's land"
between state and federal status, present significant obstacles. This
Note traces two related examples of how courts apply structural con-
stitutional doctrines to interstate compact agencies: federal jurisdiction
and vertical choice of law. Drawing lessons from courts' efforts to ap-
ply these doctrines, this Note suggests that because interstate compact
agencies occupy such an unusual position in our federal structure, it is
undesirable, if not impossible, to apply a single categorical definition of
these entities in every doctrinal area. Rather, compact agencies may
be best accommodated within existing doctrine by using a functional
methodology. Such a technique would consider the realities of the
compact at issue and thereby determine how it would be best recon-
ciled with the relevant doctrine's underlying rationale.3
This Note begins by introducing the interstate compact device.
Part II explains the constitutional authority for compacts, how they
are formed, and their historical and present uses. Part III then surveys
the treatment of interstate compact agencies under doctrines of federal
jurisdiction and vertical choice of law. In examining these issues, Part
IV argues that a functional approach best serves the constitutional
values protected by both of these doctrines and by the Compact
Clause itself.
I See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
2 This Note uses the term "structural constitutional doctrines" to refer to the various judicial
doctrines created to interpret constitutional provisions touching upon the ideals of federalism and
separation of powers, as well as doctrines created to protect those ideals.
3 This methodology is modeled after the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Hess v.
Port Authority Rans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30 (i994). Hess itself is discussed below at
pages 96-98.
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II. THE INTERSTATE COMPACT DEVICE
In the colonial and early federal period, compacts were used almost
exclusively to settle boundary disputes.4 Although this use of com-
pacts remains viable, the uses for compacts have diversified over the
years.- One of the first modern compacts to break out of the boundary
dispute mold was between New York and New Jersey, establishing the
Port of New York Authority in 1921.6 In their landmark 1925 article,
Professors Frankfurter and Landis heralded the potential of the com-
pact device for addressing complex, regional needs.7  In the past sev-
enty-five years, states have formed more than i5o compacts, address-
ing regional concerns in such wide-ranging areas as mental health,
conservation, and law enforcement.8
States derive the power to enter into agreements or compacts with
one another from the Compact Clause of Article I, which requires
them to obtain the consent of Congress to do so.9 Read literally, the
clause would include virtually any agreement between states; however,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to require consent for
only a subset of interstate agreements.10 Although original intent is
contested,' the current rule requires consent only when a compact
"may tend to increase and build up the political influence of the con-
tracting States, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the
4 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 696 (1925).
5 See INFOPACK: INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGREEMENTS OVERVIEW 1997 (Council of
State Governments ed., 1997) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter INFO-
PACK] (providing a list of compacts "believed to be in force through 1997" including, among oth-
ers, compacts regarding river management and supervision of parolees and probationers).
6 See Emanuel Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 682, 688, 692-93 (1961). Compacts have long been used as a tool for water apportion-
ment. See, e.g., Colorado River Compact, NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 538.010, 538.041-251 (i995).
7 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 4, at 707-09 (noting the potential for the compact de-
vice to address "regional problems calling for regional solutions" and citing electric power provi-
sion as an example). This Note uses the word "regional" to include both multistate metropolitan
areas and regions made up of groups of states.
8 See INFOPACK, supra note 5. According to one commentator, "[t]here was a sharp increase
in the use of compacts during the 196os, but the number of new compacts has been declining
during the past two decades." JOSEPH F. ZIMmERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERAL-
ISM 141-42 (1992). Zimmerman associates this decline with increased federal preemption of state
regulation and increased complexity of interstate problems. See id. at r42.
9 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State ... '.
10 See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-60 (6978).
1 Courts and commentators differ over how the scope of the clause was intended to be, or
should be, limited. Some explain the limits of the scope of the Compact Clause by differentiating
between the terms "treaty" and "agreement or compact," both used in Article I, section io. See
United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 463-71; David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate
Agreements: When is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 64-65, 75-81 (1965);
Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by
"Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CH. L. REv. 453, 453 (i935).
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United States or interfere with their rightful management of particular
subjects placed under their entire control.' 2
To form an interstate compact, states must reach agreement on the
terms of the compact and enact legislation entering into the compact,
in addition to obtaining congressional consent. From colonial times
until the 193os, parties to a compact usually negotiated through joint
commissions. 13  Since the 193os, compacts have often been initiated
and drafted in a somewhat less formal manner.14 In this system, after
the compact terms are formulated by a group of interested officials,
one state enacts the compact terms as part of an enabling statute,
which constitutes an offer. The offer may be accepted by other states
through the enactment of statutes including the same (or virtually the
same) compact terms.' 5 Compacts function simultaneously as con-
tracts and statutes; thus, they must meet the legal requirements for,
and will be interpreted as, both.' 6  In addition to their substantive
terms, compact documents include provisions for enactment and
amendment, and procedures for termination or withdrawal. 7
Congress consents to compacts by a statute or a joint resolution,
which usually includes the compact's terms.' 8 Although the Compact
Clause itself requires only the consent of Congress, "settled usage" has
granted the President veto power over consent, consistent with both of
12 United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 467 (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, r48 U.S. 503, 5I8
(1893)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF IN-
TERSTATE COMPACTS 16-17 (1976). Negotiation through joint commissions remains the practice
for boundary and water allocation compacts "where there is a presumption of permanence ap-
proaching perpetuity." Id. at 17.
14 See PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 7 (1982); ZIMMER-
MAN & WENDELL, supra note 13, at i7-i9.
is See HARDY, supra note 14, at 11-12. To comply with the contract law requirement that
"there must be an acceptance of what was offered," compact terms must be substantially similar
in all compacting states. Id. at ii. However, the terms of the enabling portions of the statutes
may differ to allow the compact to work within each state's existing governmental structure. See
id.
16 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987); HARDY, supra note 14, at 8. As con-
tracts, interstate compacts are subject to the prohibition against state impairment of contract obli-
gations under the Contract Clause of the Constitution. See Green v. Biddle, 2i U.S. (8 Wheat.) i,
92-93 (1823).
17 See HARDY, supra note 14, at 8-i. Usually, a compact will provide that it will take effect
upon its enactment by a requisite number of states. See ZIMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note
13, at 34-35. Compact terms may be varied by the same procedures used to enact the compact.
See VINCENT V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: A STUDY OF TIHE INTERSTATE COM-
PACT 13-14, 140 (953). Furthermore, compacts may set a date or other precondition for review
and consideration of revisions, and establish grounds for termination. See HARDY, supra note 14,
at xo-ix. Paul Hardy notes that for compacts formed to administer public works, provisions for
disposition of property upon withdrawal or termination are particularly important. See id.
18 See ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note 13, at 24; Michael H. McCabe, Interstate
Compacts, in INFOPACK, supra note 5.
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these types of legislative mechanisms. 19 Congressional consent may be
express or implied, and may precede or follow state enactment of the
compact.20  "[Clonsent may also be conditional, limited, or temporary
and is always subject to modification or repeal" by Congress.21
The federal structure of the United States allows for public provi-
sion of goods and services at both the national and state levels. How-
ever, because it is sometimes more economically efficient for an entity
larger than a single state and smaller than the federal government to
provide government services,2 2 compacts that create interstate agencies
to administer public works or to deal with a regional problem2 3 can
present unique advantages within our federal union.2 4  Especially to-
day, as politicians and commentators argue for devolution of govern-
mental responsibilities from the national government to states, locali-
ties, and regions, 25 compacts may be formed both to capture
efficiencies of regional solutions and to maintain proximity to the peo-
ple they serve.
However, in addition to the logistical issues associated with form-
ing compacts, 26 some commentators have cited the loss of state sover-
19 FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
SINCE 1925, at 94 (195'). Zimmermann and Wendell note that the threat of a presidential veto
has occasionally been an obstacle to compact formation. See ZIMMERIMANN & WENDELL, supra
note 13, at 24.
20 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (I98i); Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (ixi Wall.)
39, 6o-6i (1871) (inferring congressional consent to a compact settling a boundary dispute be-
tween Virginia and West Virginia from the statute admitting West Virginia to the Union).
21 McCabe, supra note i8; see HARDY, supra note 14, at i8-19; Celler, supra note 6, at 685-86.
But see Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (stating that Congress can
attach conditions to its consent to an interstate compact, provided the conditions are constitu-
tional, but reaching no conclusion on whether Congress may constitutionally reserve the right "to
alter, amend or repeal" a compact consent).
22 See DAVID L. SHAPIRo, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 126 (I995); Frankfurter & Landis, su-
pra note 4, at 697 ("From the point of view of geography, commerce, and engineering, the port of
New York is an organic whole. Politically, the port is split between the law-making of two States,
independent but futile in their respective spheres."). But see REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 136-40 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., I98X) (suggesting potential inefficiencies of
compacts, including cartelization).
23 See, e.g., An Act to Grant the Consent of Congress to the Kansas and Missouri Metropolitan
Culture District Compact, Pub. L. No. 103-390, § I, IO8 Stat. 4085, 4085 (1994); Tri-State High
Speed Rail Line Compact Act, 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/0.0o-75/3. (West i9go); Bi-State Metro.
Dev. Dist. (Compact Between Missouri and Illinois), Mo. REV. STAT. § 70.370 (I994).
24 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 4, at 707-08; Carlton James Gausman, Comment, The
Interstate Compact as a Solution to Regional Problems: The Kansas City Metropolitan Culture
District, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 897 passim (1997).
2S5 See Mary 0. Furer, Downsizing Government: A Historical Perspective, USA TODAY MAG.,
Nov. 1, 1997, at 56-57. Politicians and commentators differ over whether the devolution trend
has begun to wane. Compare id. with Dana Milbank, States Find Federal Powers Grow Despite
GOP Gains, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1997, at A12.
26 Critics have long argued that the stability provided by formal compacts also puts them at
risk for becoming inflexible and easily outdated. See MARSHALL E. DIMOCK & GEORGE C.S.
BENSON, CAN INTERSTATE COMPACTS SUCCEED? 16 (Public Policy Pamphlet No. 22, Harry D.
Gideonse ed., 1937); HARDY, supra note 14, at 2i; THURSBY, supra note 17, at 140-42. Including
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eignty inherent in the device as a potential disadvantage of compact-
ing.27 Taking on interstate compact obligations "diminishes the free-
dom of the state to act independently in a particular sphere of interest,
and since it has no real control over the acts of its fellow compacting
members, it is always bound to a degree by their sins of omission and
commission. 28* Further, although compact agencies may be physically
closer to the people affected by them than is the national government,
they may allow less direct accountability. Compact statutes are voted
upon initially by state and federal legislators and signed by state and
federal executives. However, once enacted, compact agencies function
just as other administrative agencies do; they are relatively insulated
from the political process and only indirectly accountable to the elec-
torate through their appointed officials. Indeed, these entities with in-
herently divided loyalties may be even less responsive than traditional
agencies located within a single state.29
within the compact documents procedures for review, amendment, and termination may some-
what lessen problems of rigidity. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. However, the crea-
tion of a compact itself presupposes that some inflexibility will remain, as stability and perma-
nence are benefits of entering a compact See HARDY, sura note 14, at 21; THURSBY, supra note
17, at 140. Critics have also noted that drafting formal agreements that will function within mul-
tiple state governmental systems is time-consuming, and thus compacts will not provide a rapid
solution to pressing regional problems. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 145 (noting that com-
pact negotiations between California and Nevada concerning water rights took twelve years,
"even though only two States were involved and there was only one issue to be resolved"). But
see ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note I3, at 54-55 (explaining that negotiating water allo-
cation compacts is exceptionally time-consuming and that other types of compacts can be negoti-
ated more quickly). Because the compacts emphasized in this Note create interstate agencies to
deal with major interstate problems, and often to administer large-scale public works, they may
require even longer drafting and negotiation periods.
27 See DIMOCK & BENSON, supra note 26, at ii. Dimock and Benson argue:
In the usual representative government the man who opposes the general interest for the
sake of political capital in his own constituency can easily be defeated by votes from other
districts. But the rule in compact government ... is that unanimous consent must be se-
cured. Politicians from one state may upset the apple cart for all the states.
Id.; accord MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 297-
99 (1971).
28 RIDGEWAY, supra note 27, at 298. At least one commentator has further "charged that the
inflexible character of compacts places pressure on the federal government to accept unsatisfac-
tory compact provisions rather than require re-enactment by the states." ZUMMERMANN & WEN-
DELL, supra note 13, at 55 (citing WALLACE R. VAVTER, INTERSTATE COMPACTS - THE
FEDERAL INTEREST 7 (Library of Congress 1954)).
29 See RIDGEWAY, supra note 27, at 30o; Celler, supra note 6, at 695; Ross D. Netherton, Area-
Development Authorities - A New Form of Government by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. REV. 678,
691-92 (i955).
If the drawbacks of compacting outweigh its advantages, other mechanisms can be used to
achieve similar results - informal agreements, enactment of uniform state laws, and state ad-
ministration of federal prograr.s using federal grants-in-aid. See THURSBY, supra note 17, at
142-43; Jonathan Varat, Economic Integration in the United States Federal System, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTrUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 29-30 (Mark Tushnet
ed., 19go). Resolution can also be sought under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as
an alternative to a negotiated compact solution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. However, in sev-
eral such cases, the Court has specifically recommended negotiation and use of an interstate com-
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Even if these structural and political complications are resolved,
there remains an issue more fundamental to interstate compacts: if in-
terstate compact agencies cannot be defined as either state or federal
entities, how are they to fit into a doctrinal reality based on a federalist
conception of dual - but no more than dual - sovereignty? Legal
doctrines establishing the spheres of the federal and state governments
often seek to define an entity as either one or the other. Interstate
compact agencies, by definition, frustrate such categorical treatment.
The remainder of this Note explores and evaluates how courts attempt
to resolve this problem in federal jurisdiction and vertical choice of
law doctrines.
Ill. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND VERTICAL CHOICE OF LAW
When a dispute develops regarding the interpretation or applica-
tion of an interstate compact, issues arise regarding which court should
hear the dispute and which law should be applied to resolve it. By
definition, more than one state creates a compact and the federal gov-
ernment consents to it. Therefore, a dispute might be brought in ei-
ther federal or state court, and often in more than one state court. In
the course of resolution by a state or federal court, at least three bodies
of law might be consulted to construe an interstate compact - federal
law and the law of at least two compacting states. In some situations,
all bodies of law will concur on the disputed point. However, when
bodies of law disagree, courts may struggle to show respect for each
state and the federal government, as well as to find an appropriate and
equitable rule of decision. This Part considers Supreme Court doc-
trine, which has resolved these issues by permitting federal jurisdiction
over interstate compact disputes and requiring federal law to govern
their interpretation and enforcement.
A. Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court first explicitly confronted the question whether
cases requiring construction of interstate compacts fall within its cer-
tiorari jurisdiction in Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v.
Colburn,30 which arose from a 1935 compact between New Jersey and
Pennsylvania to construct bridges across the Delaware River.31 The
pact as an alternative to seeking a judicial resolution of interstate conflicts. See New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 4, at 7o6 (noting the Su-
preme Court's advice to states to use compact negotiation in lieu of litigation in two boundary
dispute cases). Litigation may be more expensive than negotiation and also will not be available
in all conflicts. For example, litigation may be effective in settling a boundary dispute, but it can-
not create an agency to regulate an interstate public work.
30 310 U.S. 419 (1940).
31 See id. at 425-26. Landowners who claimed that a highway built by the Commission inter-
fered with their property rights brought a mandamus action in New Jersey state court to compel
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Court held "that the construction of [an interstate] compact sanctioned
by Congress ... involves a federal 'title, right, privilege or immunity'
which when 'specially set up and claimed' in a state court may be re-
viewed here on certiorari. '32
The question of certiorari jurisdiction over a case regarding the en-
forceability of a compact arose in West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims. 33
The case involved the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact,
entered into by eight states that agreed to cooperate in efforts to con-
trol pollution in the river.34 The commissioners brought a writ of
mandamus against the West Virginia state auditor, who had refused to
pay an appropriation for the compact even though the legislature had
authorized funds.35 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals de-
nied the writ on the grounds that the compact impermissibly delegated
the state's police power to sister states and to the federal government,
and that the compact violated the West Virginia Constitution by
binding future legislatures to appropriations for the Commission.36
The United States Supreme Court defended its jurisdiction over the
controversy on the ground that West Virginia could not be permitted
to be the judge in its own case against a sister state.37 While noting
that deference to state courts in this area was appropriate, particularly
when issues of local law were at stake, Justice Frankfurter explained
that the Supreme Court was "free to examine determinations of law by
State courts in the limited field where a compact brings in issue the
rights of other States and the United States."35
compensation proceedings. See id. at 426. The court found that the landowners were not entitled
to recover without statutory authorization, but construed an existing statute in conjunction with
the compact to require compensation. See id. at 426-2 7.
32 Id. at 427 (quoting section 237(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344). Its jurisdiction thus
established, the Court concluded that the statute relied upon by the New Jersey court was inap-
plicable to the Commission and that authorization for damages was thus lacking. See id. at 428-
34. The current statutory grant of certiorari jurisdiction contains language identical to that
quoted in Colburn. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 ('994). This language may be contrasted with that of
§ X331, which grants district courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. § 1331.
33 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
34 See id. at 24 (citing 54 Stat. 752). The compact created the Ohio River Valley Water Sanita-
tion Commission to oversee the endeavor. See id. The Commission was authorized to issue or-
ders for compliance with the compact's water treatment requirements; the orders were enforce-
able in both state and federal courts. See id. at 25.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 25-26.
37 See id. at 28.
38 Id. The Court determined that the Compact did not conflict with the West Virginia Consti-
tution, and reversed the judgment of the West Virginia court. See id. at 32.
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B. Federal Law as the Rule of Decision and Federal Question
Jurisdiction
In assessing other questions, Colburn, Dyer, and Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.39 suggested that compacts would be
governed by federal law. In Wheeling, the Court considered an origi-
nal suit by Pennsylvania seeking an injunction against the construction
over the Ohio River of a bridge that allegedly would obstruct naviga-
tion.40 In deciding whether it could properly require the bridge to be
abated as a public nuisance, the Supreme Court stated: "This compact,
by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the Union. What
further legislation can be desired for judicial action?"41 The "law of
the Union" doctrine, which emerged from this statement, arguably re-
quires that interstate compacts, as federal legislation, be construed as
federal law.42
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission43 explicitly held
what the Court had only suggested in Wheeling - that federal law
governs the interpretation of interstate compacts."4 The terms of the
compact in Petty allowed the Commission "to sue and be sued in its
own name,"45 and Congress consented to the compact, including a res-
ervation "[t]hat nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect,
impair, or diminish any right, power, or jurisdiction of the United
States or of any court, department, board, bureau, officer, or official of
the United States."46 The courts below had construed the sue-and-be-
39 54 U.S. (i3 How.) 518 (i85i).
40 See id. at 557-59. The bridge was being constructed by a Virginia corporation, under the
authority of a Virginia statute. See id. at 557. However, Virginia had previously entered into a
compact with Kentucky, to which the United States had consented upon Kentucky's admission to
the Union. See id. at 56o-6i. The terms of the compact required that "the use and navigation of
the River Ohio... shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States." Id. at 561.
41 Id. at 566 (emphasis added). The Court then ruled that the bridge created an obstruction
and ordered that the obstruction be diminished to a reasonable point. See id.
42 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 n.7 (ig8i). But see People v. Central R.R., 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 455, 456 (x872) ("The assent of Congress [to the compact] did not make the act giving it
a statute of the United States, in the sense of the [statutory grant of certiorari jurisdiction].'). The
understanding of certiorari jurisdiction enunciated in Central R.R. was expressly disclaimed in
Colburn. See Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427-28 (1940).
See generally David E. Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts: A Questionable Federal
Question, 5I VA. L. REv. 987, 991-1012 (1965) (explaining the conflict between Wheeling and
Central 1.R. and suggesting an alternative resolution).
43 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
44 See id. at 278. Petty involved a Jones Act claim by the widow of a ferry employee who died
on a sinking ferry owned by the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, an interstate compact
entity. The Commission claimed immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See id.
45 Id. at 277 (quoting art. I, § 3 of the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission Compact, Mo.
REv. STAT. § 234.360) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id. at 277 (quoting An Act Granting the Consent of Congress to a Compact or Agreement
Between the State of Tennessee and the State of Missouri, Concerning a Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Commission, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-411, ch. 758, 63 Stat. 930, 930 (i949)
(emphasis added)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sued clause of the compact in accordance with both Missouri and Ten-
nessee law, holding that neither would interpret the clause as a waiver
of Eleventh Amendment immunity by the Commission.47 The Su-
preme Court reversed, explaining that the construction of "the terms of
a consensual agreement, the meaning of which, because made by dif-
ferent States acting under the Constitution and with congressional ap-
proval, is a question of federal law."48  Thus, Petty stands for the
proposition that federal law governs the construction of interstate
compacts, even if the laws of the compacting states are consistent with
one another and jointly conflict with federal law. The majority's ab-
solutist position illustrates the attempt to force interstate compact
agencies into traditional federal or state categories.
However, the absolutist position was not universally accepted.49
Although Justice Frankfurter agreed that construction of a compact
consented to by Congress raised a federal question, he penned a strong
dissent arguing that "a federal question does not require a federal an-
swer by way of a blanket, nationwide substantive doctrine where es-
sentially local interests are at stake." 0 Rather, Justice Frankfurter
viewed the compact as a contract, to which the Court should assign
the meaning intended by the parties - the compacting states.-5
Despite Justice Frankfurter's earlier admonition, the Court ex-
tended the Petty holding in Cuyler v. Adams.5 2 Cuyler involved the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), a compact among forty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, and the United States, which allowed
for temporary relocation of prisoners to the custody of another com-
pact member to face criminal charges in that jurisdiction.5 3 The Third
Circuit vacated and remanded a district court decision permitting the
transfer of a prisoner from Pennsylvania to another compacting state,
finding that the IAD required that he be afforded a pre-transfer hear-
ing.5 4 During the appeal, a Pennsylvania state court ruled that Penn-
47 See id. at 279-80.
48 Id. at 279. The Court noted that the compact obtained congressional approval at a time
when immunity for corporations performing federal governmental functions was disfavored, and
also relied upon the reservation clause in the congressional consent act. See id. at 28o-8i (citing
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 3o6 U.S. 381 (1939)).
49 See id. at 283 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter was the author of Dyer,
upon which the Petty Court relied. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24 (i95o).
Justices Harlan and Whittaker joined the Petty dissent. See Petty, 359 U.S. at 285 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
SO Petty, 359 U.S. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51 See id. Justice Frankfurter also disputed the majority's reading of the congressional condi-
tion, whether read alone or in tandem with the compact's sue-and-be-sued clause. See id. at 285-
88. Justice Frankfurter noted that the same or substantively indistinguishable conditions were
used in many early compacts both with and without sue-and-be-sued clauses and argued that
these terms did not indicate a requirement of waiver of immunity. See id. at 286-88.
S2 449 U.S. 433 (ig8i).
53 See id. at 435 n. i.
S4 See id. at 437.
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sylvania transferees under the IAD had no right to a pre-transfer
hearing.55 The Third Circuit held that it was not bound by the state
court's decision because the IAD was an interstate compact. As such,
the compact was to be construed under federal, and not state, law.5 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit.5 7 Citing Petty, as
well as Dyer and Colburn, the Supreme Court first reiterated that
"congressional consent transforms an interstate compact within this
clause into a law of the United States, thus presenting a federal ques-
tion."5 8 The Court then explained that congressional consent was at
the core of the Compact Clause, allowing states to seek regional solu-
tions while empowering the federal government to guard against inter-
ference with federal sovereignty or with the rights of noncompacting
states.5 9 Next, noting that not all compacts come within the clause, 60
the Court explained that "where Congress has authorized the States to
enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of
that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation,
the consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into federal
law under the Compact Clause."6 1 Finding its requirements satisfied
in the case before it,62 the Court concluded that federal law gov-
erned.63
Following Cuyler, courts broadly expanded the idea that congres-
sional consent "transforms" compacts into federal law. For example,
the Fourth Circuit held not only that the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Compact was federal law "for pur-
poses of interpretation," 64 but also that it served to delegate federal
powers to the compact agency at issue.65 In another instance of sig-
nificant expansion, the Second Circuit held that a compact's employee-
55 See id. at 438.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 436, 450.
5S8 Id. at 438. An accompanying footnote described the history of the "law of the Union" doc-
trine dating back to Wheeling. See id. at 438 n.7.
59 See id. at 439-40.
60 See id. at 440 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,468
(1978) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 59 (1893))).
61 Id.
62 See id. at 440-42.
63 See id. at 442. The Court then investigated whether the IAD provided a pre-transfer hear-
ing, held that it did, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. See id. at 447-50.
Then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stew-
art, argued that the IAD was not a compact within the meaning of the Clause and that unneces-
sary congressional consent alone surely should not transform state law into federal law, See id. at
450-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenters particularly feared the potential scope of the
majority opinion, stating that "the Court's opinion threatens to become a judicial Midas mean-
dering through the state statute books, turning everything it touches into federal law." Id. at 454.
64 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 7o6 F.2d 1312, 2318 (4 th Cir.
1983).
65 See id. at 1319-21.
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benefit program was not preempted by the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) because the compact was federal law un-
der Cuyler.66 The court construed ERISA's preemption of "all State
laws" related to employee benefits as inapplicable to the compact bene-
fit program.67 Despite such expansive readings of Cuyler, courts have
maintained that compacts remain governed by state law in cases in
which an interstate compact fails to meet the Cuyler consent and sub-
ject matter requirements. 68
Based on Cuyler, it seems clear not only that the Supreme Court
has certiorari jurisdiction over cases involving compact interpretation
and enforcement, 69 but also that federal district courts can entertain
compact actions under federal question jurisdiction. 70 The grant of ju-
risdiction under § 1331 to district courts over "all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" should
provide sufficient jurisdictional grounding for virtually any compact
interpretation case if a compact consented to by Congress is considered
to be federal law.71
IV. EVALUATING FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND THE USE OF
FEDERAL LAW TO CONSTRUE COMPACTS
Although the cases establish that disputes over interpretation and
enforcement of interstate compacts will be heard by the Supreme
Court on certiorari and by lower federal courts under § 1331, not all
66 See NYSA-ILA Vacation and Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm'n, 732 F.2d 292, 297-98
(2d Cir. 1984).
67 Id. at 296. The court noted that although ERISA's provisions supersede "all State laws in-
sofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," the statute does not "al-
ter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States." Id. at 296 &
n.8 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 144(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 See, e.g., Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138, 142 (8th Cir. iggi). Stewart held that the In-
terstate Corrections Compact was neither approved by Congress nor an appropriate subject for
congressional legislation and thus had not been transformed into federal law that could provide
the basis for a prisoner's § 1983 claim. See id.
69 See supra pp. 1996-97.
70 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (i98I) ("[The construction of an interstate agree-
ment sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause presents a federal question."); see also
League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517, 519-22 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding, prior to the decision in Cuyler, that cases involving the interpretation of interstate com-
pacts would present federal questions and noting that this issue was one of first impression). But
see, e.g., Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 937, 939 (E.D.N.Y.
1958) (holding, in a case predating Cuyler, that a compact case was not cognizable under federal
question jurisdiction).
71 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). The issue of compact interpretation or enforcement must be ap-
parent on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149, r53-54 (i9o8). Additional cases involving compact terms or agencies might come
under the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts as hybrid cases of jurisdiction, in
which federal question jurisdiction lies because "vindication of a right under state law necessarily
turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vaca-
tion Trust, 463 U.S. I, 9 (i982).
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scholars agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Compact
Clause. Writing before Cuyler, but assuming that the Court would
follow the "law of the Union" doctrine and treat congressional consent
to a compact as transforming a compact into federal law, Professor
Engdahl argued that consent should not be equated with legislation,
but rather should be analogized to Congress's consent either to a
state's constitution upon entry into the Union or to state regulation. 72
A state constitution remains state law, not an act of Congress, and is
"subject to alteration and amendment by the State after admission." 73
Thus, under Engdahl's analogy, classification of compact consent acts
as federal legislation would not alone be sufficient to justify certiorari
review in the Supreme Court. 74 This could be argued even more
strongly with respect to the more limited federal question jurisdiction
in lower federal courts.
However, theories other than "transformation" also support federal
jurisdiction over compact cases. An independent justification for fed-
eral jurisdiction is that federal courts provide a more neutral forum
than state courts. 75 This argument also underlies the constitutional
grant of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over disputes be-
tween states.7 6 Of course, if one compacting state brings a suit against
another, it may invoke the grant of federal jurisdiction over litigation
between states. However, even when the parties are not states, state
interests may nevertheless conflict, and trying the case in one state
may be prejudicial to another.
Furthermore, whether or not compacts are federal law, the federal
government may still have an interest in settling compact disputes.
72 See Engdahl, supra note 42, at I15-16 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1911)).
Professor Engdahl also noted that equating consent with legislation is inappropriate because con-
sent by implication would be a suspect vehicle for legislation; because consent preceding compact
drafting might be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; and because Congress
lacks the authority to legislate on many of the subjects of compacts to which it consents. See id.
at xox6-x 9 .
73 Id. at ioi6 (quoting Coyle, 221 U.S. at 568) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74 See id. at 1017.
75 Concerns for state sovereignty and accurate outcomes on state law issues, which militate
against federal jurisdiction in many cases, are less powerful in the compact context. First, the
courts of one of the compacting states might favor the position of their own state over those of
other compact members. Second, if the choice of law rule suggested below is applied, see infra p.
2oo5, a state court might consciously or unconsciously harmonize the law of the other compacting
states with its own law in order to apply that law to decide the case.
The "neutrality" rationale for federal jurisdiction would be partially satisfied by preserving the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Even Engdahl agrees that there are arguments other
than "transformation" to support the retention of certiorari review over compact cases. See Eng-
dahl, supra note 42, at i026-4o. However, given the limited capacity of the Supreme Court
docket, the Court would be capable of providing a forum for only a small number of compact
disputes. See The Supreme Court, zg96 Term - The Statistics, iii HARv. L. REV. 431, 435 tbl.2
(1997) (noting that the Court granted only 3.2% of all petitions for appellate review).
76 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. i; THE FEDERALIST No. 8o, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., i96i).
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The constitutional requirement of congressional consent has been in-
terpreted as a means to preserve the balance between federal and state
sovereignty and protect the interests of noncompacting states. 7 How-
ever, according to the interpretive principle of expressio uniUS,78 the
requirement of congressional consent can also be interpreted as a rea-
son to reject federal court jurisdiction. Granting federal jurisdiction
over compact cases arguably contravenes an implied state sovereignty
over interstate compacts that is limited only by the requirement of
congressional consent.
Courts face similar issues concerning state sovereignty and forum
neutrality when considering the rule of decision in compact cases. Be-
cause compacts are to be construed with reference to federal law,79
courts may look first to statutes80 and then, if there are none, to federal
common law8' to interpret and enforce them. 2 Courts do not always
specifically assert that they are using federal common law to interpret
the compacts they consider, but when federal courts interpret or en-
force the terms of a compact without resort to statutes or other sources
of positive law, they make federal common law.83
77 See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,472, 477 (1978).
78 "'[E]xpressio [or inclusio] unius est exclusio alterius' means 'inclusion of one thing indicates
exclusion of the other.'" WILL IAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 638 (2d ed.
1995).
79 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (ig8i).
80 See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281 (1959) (using the
language of a consent act's provision reserving federal jurisdiction to support a holding of non-
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
81 See, e.g., id. at 280-SI (citing Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 3o6 U.S. 375
(1939), as supporting a federal common law presumption against immunity for agencies perform-
ing federal governmental functions); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 733-39 (3d Cir. 1996) (using
federal decisions to interpret the language of an interstate compact concerning the removal of
compact officers). In some cases, courts may look to both statutory and common law sources in
interpreting interstate compacts. See Petty, 359 U.S. at 280-82.
82 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) ("In [the] absence of an
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law accord-
ing to their own standards."). The ambiguous legal status of congressional consent acts, as both
statutes and codifications of contracts, further complicates the choice of law question. See Texas
v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (explaining that although a compact is a statute, it is also
a contract, and "remains a legal document that must be construed and applied in accordance with
its terms").
83 Commentators' definitions of federal common law differ widely. See, e.g., Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 88i, 89o-9i (1986) (defin-
ing federal common law as "any rule of federal law created by a court ... when the substance of
that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments") (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted);
Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 267 (1992) (de-
fining federal common law as "any rule articulated by a court that is not easily found on the face
of an applicable statute"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 328
(1992) (dividing federal common law into categories of interpretation of enacted law and "judicial
prerogative," wherein courts "create rules of decision based solely on a claim of inherent author-
ity").
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There would be many benefits to fashioning federal common law to
govern interstate compacts. It would provide uniformity, serve as an
unbiased source of law for resolving conflicts in which the compacting
states are opposed, and protect federal interests intended to be safe-
guarded by the consent requirement. These benefits, however, will not
accrue in some compact cases. Moreover, national uniformity often
may not be important in compact cases, or may be obtained only at
significant cost. Finally, many cases will not involve a conflict be-
tween compacting states, and federal interests may often be fully pro-
tected by the consent mechanism. Thus, even if there are advantages
to hearing compact disputes in federal court, these advantages do not
depend on the application of federal rules of decision.8 4
In cases like Petty, in which the law of the compacting states con-
curred on an issue, but the court nevertheless applied conflicting fed-
eral law, the requirement of following a federal rule of decision is un-
duly harsh. Indeed, this requirement expands the ways in which the
federal government may control interstate compacts. First, the federal
government exercises control at the stage of congressional approval,
during which Congress may either deny consent entirely, or, threaten-
ing such denial, may attach conditions to the compact. Second, it ex-
ercises control during litigation by hearing the case in federal court.
Third, also during litigation, it exercises control through the applica-
tion of federal law in matters of interpretation, even when the laws of
the compacting states are consistent with each other and not detrimen-
tal to noncompacting states.
Consider a case in which the federal common law chosen to govern
a compact suit conflicts with all of the compacting states' laws on the
subject at issue. If a court applies a conflicting federal rule of decision,
there may be uniformity of law governing compacts across the differ-
ent states, but there will be a divergence between the law governing
the compact's actions and the law governing other entities within the
compacting states. In the case of a compact created to administer an
interstate public work or to serve a confined geographical area, consis-
tency with the law governing other actors that interact with the com-
pact agency may be more important than consistency with the law
governing a similar compact in another region of the country.8 5
Another potential problem with using federal common law to gov-
ern construction of compacts is that common law is fashioned on a
84 See, e.g., Petty, 359 U.S. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Erie &R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938) (requiring federal courts sitting in diversity cases to apply state substantive law,
rather than "general" federal common law). Even cases espousing the rule that federal law gov-
erns compact interpretation note that deference should be paid to state law in this area. See
Petty, 359 U.S. at 278 n.4.
85 Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (noting that in deciding
whether to absorb a state rule as federal law, the court "must consider the extent to which appli-
cation of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law').
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case-by-case basis.8 6  If state law were to govern, compact agencies
and those individuals or entities who interact with them would have a
more established body of law to guide their interpretations of compact
documents and the actions taken pursuant to them. When federal
common law governs, in order to determine the rule that will be en-
forced, compacting parties must wait for judges to resolve each type of
issue that may arise. Of course, federal common law would likely be
chosen from a limited number of rules and would grow as more com-
pact cases were decided; but this would only lessen, not eradicate, the
unpredictability problem.
Because the benefits of using federal common law rather than state
law do not always outweigh the costs, it would be preferable to insti-
tute a functional choice of law rule that provides circumstances in
which federal courts should adopt state law as the federal rule of deci-
sion. Such a rule would retain many of the benefits of using federal
common law, while reducing some of the attendant costs by providing
stability and predictability, thus easing transaction costs for compact
agencies. This rule would presume that the compacting states' law
should be adopted when the compacting states' laws are consistent,
uniformity is not a paramount concern, and the state law rule will not
frustrate federal interests. Although federal courts determine federal
common law, they may, and often do, draw upon and adopt state law
as federal common law.8 7 Compact cases are ripe for absorption of
state law into federal common law, which "can only arise in an area
which is sufficiently close to a national operation to establish compe-
tence in the federal courts to choose the governing law, and yet not so
close as clearly to require the application of a single nationwide rule of
substance."""
Several Supreme Court decisions have considered when federal
courts should adopt state law as the rule of decision. 9 Criteria set
forth in these cases can be used in determining whether to absorb state
law in a compact case. First, the Court has held that a state rule shall
not be absorbed as a federal rule of decision if it is adverse to federal
86 See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, io5 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 804-05 ('957). State
common law is, of course, created incrementally as well; however, it is likely that state contract
law and other areas of private law will be more fully developed than federal law on these topics.
87 See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 58o-8i (956). See generally Mishkin, supra
note 86, at 810-14 (discussing the factors that courts should consider in deciding whether to ab-
sorb state law as the rule of federal common law).
88 Mishkin, supra note 86, at 8o5. Many compact cases specifically state that courts should
show deference to state law in this context despite the fact that state law is not binding. See, e.g.,
Petty, 359 U.S. at 278 n.4; West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
89 See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, 44o U.S. at 728 (i979) ("[Wihen there is little need for a nationally
uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision.").
1998] 2005
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
policy goals, programs, or other interests.90 Second, state law shall not
be absorbed as the rule of decision when national uniformity is neces-
sary.91 Third, judges determining whether to adopt state law should
take into account "the extent to which application of a federal rule
would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. '92
Finally, even in situations in which absorption would generally be ap-
propriate, federal courts need not absorb state law that is anomalous
compared to the laws of most states.93 When compact cases meet
these requirements, adopting state law would be less harsh than the
rule that federal law controls compact interpretation and enforcement,
but would protect the federalism values upon which vertical choice of
law doctrine is grounded.
Of course, turning to state law will not always be an appropriate
solution. There will be times when national uniformity is important.
For example, in cases in which similar compacts in different regions
will interact substantially with federal programs or agencies, adopting
the applicable state laws for each compact would hinder national ad-
ministration. In such cases, concerns about national uniformity are
more salient, and a single rule of federal common law may be neces-
sary. Similar concerns exist when compacts encompass or have the po-
tential to encompass a large or geographically diverse group of states.
In such circumstances, it is less likely that all states' rules would be
consistent or that they would remain so after other states join the
compact. There will also surely be cases in which the different com-
pacting states' laws will conflict. 94 Finally, in some cases it may be
90 See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597 (1973) (noting that to
adopt state law on the issue in conflict would "deal a serious blow to the congressional scheme
contemplated by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act"); Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 3o8
U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939) (explaining that state law is absorbed when "recognition of state interests
was not deemed inconsistent with federal policy").
91 Compare United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354-58 (1966) (holding that uniformity was
unnecessary in a case involving the federal government's desire to proceed against the separate
property of the wife of a debtor who defaulted on a Small Business Association loan when state
law did not allow such recovery, and that therefore state law should govern), with Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (r943) (holding that state law would not be absorbed be-
cause of the need for uniformity in laws governing United States commercial paper).
92 Kimbell Foods, 44c U.S. at 728-29.
93 For example, in De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), the Court explained that al-
though state definitions of "child" would be used to determine who would be a child under the
Copyright Act when the Act provided no guidance, a state would not be "entitled to use the word
'children' in a way entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage." Id. at 582.
94 This problem might be resolved by allowing the federal court to create a horizontal choice
of law rule to enable it to choose from among the states' laws. See Mishkin, supra note 86, at
8o6-o8. However, such a solution would most often have the same result as a rule allowing the
federal court to adopt as federal common law whichever law it preferred, regardless of the possi-
bilities presented by the laws of the compacting states. Thus, creating a choice of law rule would
seem to add an unwarranted complication.
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difficult for the federal court to determine the content of a state's law
and thus it would be difficult to adopt it.95
In all other interstate compact suits requiring application of federal
common law, federal courts should presume to adopt state law as fed-
eral common law. By adopting state law in such cases, federal courts
would protect the constitutional value of state sovereignty that moti-
vates federal jurisdiction and vertical choice of law doctrines. In addi-
tion, this functional methodology would ease compact agencies' trans-
actions in commercial settings, and ensure national uniformity when it
is necessary.
This functional, policy-driven approach need not be limited to ju-
risdictional and choice of law questions. Indeed, this approach was
taken by the Supreme Court in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp.,96 when it looked to the Eleventh Amendment's "twin reasons
for being" to determine whether Eleventh Amendment immunity
should apply to an interstate compact agency.9 7 Finding those reasons
to be the protection of the dignity of the states and the protection of
their treasuries, the Court examined whether the Port Authority's
amenability to suit in federal court threatened the dignity and treasur-
ies of New York and New Jersey.98 Because the states were required
to join with the federal government to create the Port Authority, and
their treasuries could not be tapped by it, the Court found that Elev-
enth Amendment immunity did not apply.99 Rather than trying to fit
the compact agency into an established category, this inquiry recog-
nized the agency's unusual character and used the concerns motivating
Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine to determine whether it
should apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
Interstate compact agencies occupy a unique position in American
federalism, existing in the gap between the ordinary concepts of state
and federal. They are created by states, consented to by the federal
government, and generally operated by state-appointed officials. The
unusual position of interstate compacts and the sparse mention of
them in the Constitution suggest no framework for dealing with com-
pact agencies within traditional jurisdictional and choice of law doc-
trine. Therefore, courts should address these questions in the compact
context by looking in each case to the rationales behind the doctrines
that they seek to apply, as well as to policy considerations.
9S See id. at 8o8-io.
96 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
97 See id. at 32.
98 See id. at 41-51.
99 See id. at 52-53.
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Federal jurisdiction over compact interpretation and enforcement
disputes is necessary to provide a single, unbiased forum.100 Deciding
which law to apply is a more complex question. It may be useful to
treat compacts as federal in nature - in the sense of applying federal
law to construe and enforce them - because such a treatment would
direct courts to a single federal rule, instead of to consideration of the
law of two or more states. This is less true when the federal law to be
applied is federal common law, in which case the substance of the fed-
eral law may be uncertain, but the rule chosen would become a uni-
form federal rule of law to govern current and future cases.
However, when the laws of the compacting states do not conflict
and the courts will have to use federal common law to decide an issue
of compact construction or interpretation, the argument for adopting
state law as the federal rule of decision is quite strong, particularly if
the content of the federal law differs from that of all of the compacting
states. Federal courts are part of the limited federal government, and
in issues of vertical choice of law, concern for state autonomy and sov-
ereignty is central. Further, compact agencies must act within the
commercial arena controlled by state law. To subject these entities to
different law than that which governs other commercial actors may
unnecessarily raise their transaction costs. A choice of law rule re-
quiring federal courts to adopt state law as the governing rule of fed-
eral common law in an interstate compact dispute when the law of the
compacting states is uniform allows courts to maintain the proper re-
spect for state law in a federal government. Yet it captures the advan-
tages federal law offers in situations in which the laws of the com-
pacting states differ.
To attempt to force interstate compact agencies into a strictly state
or federal mold would strip them of the very qualities that make them
flexible and effective tools with which to attack regional problems.
Rather than trying to pigeonhole compacts into a "state" or "federal"
category, courts should use federalism-related doctrines' "reasons for
being"' 0 ' to determine how to apply those doctrines to Compact
Clause entities.
100 Of course, this argument might be pushed further to require exclusive federal jurisdiction
over compact disputes. However, concurrent jurisdiction would be more appropriate because it
would serve the interests of maintaining state involvement in compact adjudication and retaining
some state authority over compacts.
101 Hess, 513 U.S. at 47.
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